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A  NON-COMPETITIVE, EQUILIBRIUM 
MODEL OF FLUCTUATIONS 
ABSTRACT 
An  equilibrium model  of fluctuations  has  two  components:  an elastic 
labor supply schedule  and a source of shifts of the labor demand schedule. 
In  the  real  business cycle model, shifts  of labor  demand  follow  from 
vibrations in the production function.  In the model of this paper, shifts of 
labor  demand are the result  of changes in preferences.  Total real  GNP 
falls  when  demand  shifts  away  from  goods  produced  by  sectors with 
market  power and  toward  competitive sectors.  The  observed cyclical 
stability of relative prices is consistent with such demand shifts. 
Robert E. Hall 
Hoover  Institution 
Stanford University 
Stanford, California 94305 At  a very general level, macroeconomists have  a  common  view 
about  the basic elements of a model of fluctuations in aggregate output 
and  employment.  First,  labor supply is effectively  highly elastic.  Real 
business cycle theorists posit sufficiently  high intertemporal substitution in 
leisure that the labor supply schedule for temporary movements of the real 
wage  is  very  elastic.  Others,  who  question  high  intertemporal 
substitution,  embrace theories of efficiency wages or other  theories where 
large movements in hours of work can occur without significant changes in 
real wages. 
The second area of basic agreement is that shifts labor demand are 
the basic driving force of fluctuations.  In the real business cycle model, 
vibrations of the production  function are responsible for  movements  of 
labor demand.  Critics have  pointed  out that  technical regress is not a 
convincing  explanation of recessions.  But within a one-sector model, the 
sources  of shifts of labor demand are closely circumscribed.  Any  inward 
shift of the marginal product of labor schedule  is interpretable as technical 
regress.  Hence a two-sector model seems a more natural  one to generate 
upward and downward shifts in labor demand.  Net demand will fluctuate 
only if there are important asymmetries between the sectors. 
The  basic  idea of this paper  is to  explore  the  asymmetry that 
results  from  the coexistence  of monopoly and  competitive  sectors.  The 
monopoly sector might be manufacturing and the competitive sector the 
rest  of the  economy.  Shifts  of demand  generate fluctuations  in  total 
output because resources  are not  usually fully  utilized in the monopoly sector whereas the competitive sector always produces at capacity. 
The principal objective  of this paper is to develop a model in the 
equilibrium style that combines elastic labor supply with the driving force 
of shifts in  the composition of demand.  IL  the  model, contractions in 
aggregate  output  are  inefficient,  because  they  are  the  result  of 
inappropriately  low  levels  of output of the monopoly good.  However, 
there  is  much more to the analysis than just the simple point  that the 
social cost of reductions in output  is higher in a non-competitive economy. 
'That point has already been made effectively by Akerlof aud Yelien (1985) 
and  Maukiw (1985).  The  point here is that a competitive economy has a 
strong  drive  to  full  resource  utilisation,  whereas  that  drive  is  much 
attenuated in  a  non-competitive economy.  The competitor  puts  all  his 
output on  the market;  the  price-maker always has  to worry about the 
effect of more output  on  the price he gets for  his existing output.  The 
analysis has some points in corncnon with Oliver Hart's  (1982) important 
paper. 
The model  in this paper relies entirely on the equilibrium mode  of 
analysis.  The preferences  of the actors are clearly stated, the technology is 
spelled out, and the restrictions on the interactions of the actors are made 
plain.  Subject to those restrictions, there are no opportunities  for Pareto 
improvements.  The central departure from most other equilibrium models 
is  non-competitive behavior on the part  of some sellers.  These sellers 
perceive the true demand schedule  for their products and maximize profit 
subject  to  that  schedule.  Of  course,  the  resulting  equilibrium  is 
inefficient—Pareto-preferable  allocations are available.  However, I assume 
that no  collective  action on the part of consumers is possible  to achieve 
2 those improved allocations. 
As usual in equilibrium models, clarity and precision are achieved 
at considerable cost in realism.  There is no more than an analogy between 
the recession  state in  this  model and  what actually happens  in  the U.S. 
economy  in recession.  But the essential elements are there, in my view.  A 
recession  involves  unused  resources  and  it is a time  when no actor can 
improve his well-being by making a simple deal. 
The question of  driving forces 
Any model  of fluctuations has to take a stand  on the sources  of 
those fluctuations.  Some commentators have made a distinction between 
aggregate  demand  and  supply  disturbances  as  driving  forces  in 
fluctuations,  However,  in  general equilibrium, the distinction  between 
demand  and supply is not fundamental.  A  better distinction  is among 
shifts in preferences, in technology, and in policy. 
Recent  equilibrium  models,  such  as  Prescott's  (1986),  have 
stressed technology shifts  as the basic driving force of fluctuations.  In 
models  with  only  a  single  produced  good,  preference  shocks  are 
unattractive  as  a  driving  force  because  they  amount  to  explaining 
recessions  as  periods of epidemic laziness, when  the  public  prefers  to 
languish at home rather than work. 
The model in  this paper  contains shifts in both  preferences and 
technology.  The two shifts are incorporated in  the model  in such a way 
that  only  their  product  influences  real  allocations.  In  the  basic 
3 development of the model, I will talk about the "driving variable," which 
is  the  product  of  the  two  shift  variables.  Later  I  will  discuss  how 
preference shifts  differ  from technology shifts in their  effects  on relative 
prices.  It tnrns out that preference shifts generate fluctuations that look 
like the ones discussed in the traditional  account of variations in aggregate 
demand,  whereas  technology  shifts  look  more  like  the  fluctuations 
generated by real business cycle models. 
1.  The model 
The economy has two sectors.  In the first, there are worker-producers 
who make a good, x1, and consume both x1 and the other good, x2.  There 
are a great many of them and they are always price-takers.  They have an 
endowment, z, of good  1.  Their  preferences  are stated in an indirect 
utility function, 
i  [ 1c1 
(1.1)  V(p,y) 
L  P2 
1  +  log () 
Here Pi  and P2  are the two  prices and  y is  income.  The  variable  S 
influences the  allocation  of  income between  the  two  goods;  it  will  be 
4 considered  one of the two driving forces of fluctuations.1  The parameter  e 
controls the elasticity of demand for good 2 and is assumed to exceed one. 
These preferences were proposed by Burtless and  Hausman (1978)  in the 
context of labor supply.  The demand for good 2 is 
9V 
—  rf  —  P2  x2  —  -P2)  — 
ôy 
—  r6 P21  -  [  J  Pi 
I  will  take good I as numeraire and note that y =  so the demand 
schedule for good 2  is: 
= [  ] 
I assume the following about the technology:  Sector 2 produces 9 
units of x2  by using 1 unit of good 1  as raw material.  The variable 9 is 
1Readers of the earlier version of the paper  should note that  6 
does not shift the elasticity of demand for good 2, only the level.  The 
paper  does  not rest  on any  cyclical  changes in the elasticity of demand. 
5 the other driving force of fluctuations.  Sector 2  has a  physical capacity 
limit, z,  The owners  of sector 2 consume only x1, so their objective is to 
maximize their profit or consumption of good 1.  The workers in sector 2 
are incapable of working in sector 1 and they do not value their own time. 
The variables S and 8  are specified so that for both, higher values 
are  associated with  greater  output of good 2.  1  will  also  consider  the 
product,  8 8, to measure their combined effect. 
Competition 
To find the competitive equilibrium in the model, I will examine 
the excess demand function for good 2: 
(L4)  E(p2)  =  D(p2)  if  P2 < 
(1.5)  =  [D() 
- 
z2,  D()j 
if P2  = 
(1.6)  =  D(p2)  -  z2  if  P2  > 
In 1.4 , price is below cost in sector 2,  so supply is zero and excess demand 
6 is positive.  In 1.5, price is at the point where supply from sector 2  is 
perfectly  elastic.  Excess demand  is  a  correspondence, but  there is  a 
possibility  that it includes only positive values.  Finally, in 1.6,  price is 
sufficiently high that producers in sector 2 operate at capacity, z2.  If there 
was  no  equilibrium  in  1.5  in  the  perfectly elastic  part of the  supply 
schedule, at price 9, there will be one at a higher price in 1.6.  That price 
r z1 
P2  =  [ij 
Because this price exceeds £11, sector  2 operates at capacity: 
x2  =  z2 
The critical point at which sector 2 just reaches capacity is described by 
D()  =  Z2 
or 
—C  (60)  z1  =  z2 
Note that this depends just on the product, q.  The critical point is 
7 (LII)  =  [j 
The real  allocations  in  the  economy are  controlled  by  the  composite 
variable .  If  times  are  sufficiently  bad  that  <  4"  ,  then  the 
equilibrium occurs at a level of output below capacity and price is equal to 
marginal materials cost: 
(1.12)  P2 
(1.13)  = 
If times are good and  > ,  then x2 is at its capacity  level  z2,  The 
relation between  output and the driving variable  th  is shown  in  Figure 1. 
Sector  2  operates  at capacity except in  the most unfavorable conditions. 
In those conditions, price falls all the way  to the marginal cost of raw 
materials; workers  earn no wages and owners earn no rents in sector 2. 
Monopoly 
The demand  schedule facing sector 2 is 
(1.14)  D(p9)  = [  ] 
In the monopoly case, sector 2 maximizes its consumption of good 1: 
8 Figure  1.  Output under competition 
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subject to D(p2) <  z2. 
At an internal maximum, the optimal price is 
(1J6)  P2  = 
= 
Here, p is the markup ratio, c/(c - 1); price is a markup on marginal cost. 
Output is 
(L17)  x9  = 
Again, the real allocation depends just on the composite, th.  A comparison 
of i17 to 1.10 shows that the critical value of the driving variable where 
the monopoly reaches full capacity output is 
Comparison of competition and monopoly 
In the model, the capacity of sector 2 is a given value,  not chosen 
by the economy's actors,  I will compare competition and monopoly for 
10 the case where the capacity is the same.  Of course, if the monopolist has 
an exclusive  license  for  selling the second product,  he would choose less 
than the competitive level of capacity.  By the competitive level, I mean 
the level that would result from free entry.  In comparison to the exclusive 
license case, my results  will  overstate  the tendency for  a  monopolist to 
have excess capacity.  On the other hand, if the monopolist does not have 
an exclusive  license and must defend  a profitable  position, that defense 
might  well  involve  holding  at  least  the  competitive  level of capacity. 
Hence the comparison at equal levels of capacity is a reasonable one. 
Figure  2  compares the relations  between the driving  variable 
and the level of output for the cases of monopoly and competition.  There 
is a range of values of  under which the competitive economy  operates at 
capacity but the monopolistic economy  has unused capacity.  That range 
￿  /1* 
The width  of  the  interval  is  controlled  in  proportional  terms  by  the 
markup  ratio, p.  If that ratio is 1.5, for example, then the monopolistic 
economy has idle resources at values of  up to 1.5 times as high as the 
ones where the competitive economy  begins to operate at capacity. 














Sector 2 output 
1.3 
0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8 
Driving variable, 0 2.  Fluctuations 
Because there is no capital,  the model can serve as a fluctuations 
model without further elaboration.  In each period, there is a drawing 
from  a  probability  distribution  F(.)  for  the  driving  variable.  The 
determination  of  output,  as  derived  in  the  previous  section,  can  be 
summarized for the competitive case as 
(2.1)  xt  =  i,bc(t)  =  z1  if  < 
z2  otherwise 
I have  dropped the subscript  2  from xt  because the output of sector  1 
never departs from its capacity, z1.  The critical value, ,  for the driving 
variable  is  (z2/zi)1;  whenever  > ,  the  competitive  economy 
reaches capacity output in sector 2. 
Output for the monopolistic case is simply 
(2.2)  =  ,bm(t)  c( 
In both cases, the price of good 2 can be obtained from the inverse 
of the demand function: 
r z1  (2.3)  t =  6 [rj 
13 Again, I have dropped the subscript 2. 
The  foflowing  disussion will  make  t:he  assumption that there  is 
some chance that  will be below  the level, p, and  so  in the region 
where sector 2  operates below  capacity  and  monopely power affects the 
allocation.  That assumption can be expressed  as  >  0  Then 
there are four ways to express  the general conclusion that the monopolictic 
economy is more vulnerable to episodes & unmed rapacity: 
1.  The  expected  value  of x  ic  lewer  under  monoxoly  than  under 
competitIon. 
2.  The monopolistic economy  has unused eapait: a iargrr fraction  of the 
time;  the probability of slack  nuder  monopoly is F(ic  which  exceeds 
the probability of slack under competition. F(ç55). 
3.  If F(*) = 0, then  the competitive economy  will  always operate  at 
capacity. whereas  the mcnopollstic economy  will  have slack wt*enever & 
< 
4.  Under conditions when both economies would  have slack (tht  < 
the monopolistic economy always has more slack: m < d 
As  Figure  2  demenr' e, i is  no'  asc  that the  inef5ciency 
associated with  monopoly  pc w  has  ten  ynneral  effect  f reducing  the 
output  of sector 2 in equilibrium.  itatl-tr, P r  Impart i  concentrated in 
14 bad  times.  The  reason  for  this  is  simple.  Once sector  2  reaches its 
capacity,  monopoly power has  no  effect  on  its  output  or price.  The 
adverse effects of monopoly occur  only when output is below capacity; this 
happens only in bad times. 
Aggregate output 
The output of sector  1  is always  equal  to  its  endowment  z1. 
Excess capacity cannot occur  as long as good 1  is valued positively; that 
is, p is finite.  Only the output of sector 2 changes over time.  Aggregate 
output could be measured as real GNP, 
(2.4)  y  =  -  x2  +  p0 x2 
The quantity z1  -  x2 is deliveries  of good  1  to final demand and p0x is 
deliveries of good 2 to final demand, valued at a base year price Po  Real 
GNP can also be expressed as the sum of value added in the two sectors: 
(2.5)  y  =  z1  +  (Po  - )  X2 
As long as the base-year price, p, exceeds marginal materials, cost, ,  real 
GNP will be positively related to sector 2 output. 
The  preference shift,  5,  which  only  changes the  composition  of 
15 demand at the level  of the individual, affects the level of output in the 
aggregate.  The influence is much greater in the case of monopoly, because 
Po will exceed 0' by a wider margin in that case.  The technology shift, 9, 
operates in the same way by influencing  the level of x2  and also increases 
real  GNTP  by reduciug  the input  requirement, 9' x2,  which is a charge 
against real GNP. 
I conclude that the variations in the output of sector 2  will give 
rise to fluctuations in real GNP.  To put it a different way, fluctuations in 
real GNP will he seen as fluctuations in  the sum of the value added in a 
cyclically stable sector (sector 1) and cyclically sensitive sector (sector 2). 
3.  Comparison of shifts in preferences and in technology 
One  of  the  salient  characteristics  of  fluctuations  in  modern 
economies  is  the  insensitivity  of  relative  prices  and  wages  to  slack 
conditions,  Traditional  macroeconomic thinking  has  made  price-wage 
rigidity a starting point for explanations of fluctuations,  Other models, 
including  this  one,  derive  price  rigidity  from  assumptions  about  the 
underlying characteristics of the economy,  In  this model,  there  is  no 
distinction  between workers and owaers, so  there is no  way  to measure 
wage rigidity.  However, it is possible  to examine the cyclical movements 
of the relative price. 
The  movements  of  the  relative  price are  quite  different  under 
preference st1nts  from  those under  technology  shifts.  Co-movements of 
16 relative price and relative quantity  are one of the ways to determine the 
relative  importance of the two driving forces  In competition, a slnft of 
preferences toward good 2  will raise its relative price.  On the other hand. 
an improvement in tile technology  in sector 2 will lower the r°lative price. 
In monopoly, the second statement remains true. but the first may fail.  to 
the region of constant marginal cost, with outpnt  below capacity in sector 
2, the behavior of the monopolist's price depends on  the behavior of the 
elasticity of demand.  nile relative price can  ri,c or fail when preferencm 
shift, depending on what ltappen to thc eiasticity. 
Shifts in preferences 
Figure 3 plo s tile relative price of good 2 against the value of the 
preference sinF, ô, fur both conpciitlun and  aonupoly.  The plot as0urne 
a constanr value oi 0 u 1.  Lnder competition  LIl price d coittant at 0 
=  I  up to capacity  Above that, the relati'  price  serves  its function nf 
allocating  the  increasingiy scarce  fixed  capacity  of  sector  2.  Under 
monopoly, however,  the relative price is cnndant  oser a much wider raage. 
When output reaches  capacity, monopoly no longer has any  effect.  Price 
is set purely by  he competitive principle of aflocating scarce capacity. 
U' the preference  variable  S  varies in a  region  mostly  below  th 
capacIty  potat,  6'r10  the  relation  netween  output  and  price w:  0€ 
essentially fiat,  The relative price will appear  mc' be rigid.  Be: ,c r,ge 
is the result of monopoly power with constant  demand  elaat'clm:  a" a 
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Preference shift direct assumption of the model.  If the elasticity of demand rises when the 
level of demand rises,  then  the  relative  price will  move inversely ;sith 
output, up to capacity output. 
Shifts in technology 
It  is  an  unambiguous unphca ion  of  both  competition  and 
monopoly  rhac  iznprcverriex'-  ii  t!e uroilur tivity  of secter 2  lower  the 
relative price of good 2.  f;gore  1  illustrates the  relationship bt  tween he 
relative  price  and  the  driving  vartahie,  when  all  the  variations  in  the 
dri'ing voriabl'  conic front trte technobgy  sariable  0  and the prefererict 
variabe r iS held cor,tarit at 2.  1 or hurl, cornpeui1)n and monopoly, he 
relative price declines  in the region  there output is helov capacity.  Ahoy 
capacity, marginal  cost  is  irrelevant; pri 'e  is at the level needed to ration 
scarce capacity  hence,  the price reir;ain., constant a,  0  rises beyond lii' 
fish-capacity point.  linprovenrents  in  technology are captured as high"' 
earnings by prodncere in that region 
One of the iriterestin  feat nres of Figure 4 is that price rigidiry is 
more pronounced in competition  than  ni  monopoly.  As I have  stressed 
earlier,  the  monopoly is  more likely  to operate below capacity.  Below 
capacity,  price  is  negatively  related  to  the  productivity  variable  and 
negative y related to output. 
19 Figure 4. 











0.4  0.6  0.8  1  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8 Conclusions from relative price movements 
I believe that it is a reasonable stylized fact of business cycles that 
there are no  robust and important  fluctuations in  relative prices over the 
cycle.  Cyclcally-sensitive"  prices are hard  to  find and  are  limited to 
quantitatively  unimportant  sectors such as scrap metal.  There  evidence 
that in  deep. prolonged contractions, thc prices of conipetitively-supplicd 
goods tend to fall more than those of monopoly  or oligopoly goods (Stigler 
(1947)). 
The stylized fact of roughly constant  relative prices  is consistent 
with  the  preference-shift story  of Fignre  3,  where  the  relative  price of 
sector 2  is roughly independent  of ontpnt.  It  is inconsistent  with  the 
technoiogy-slnft story  of Figure 4, which  would  call  for  a declining price 
for an expanding sector. 
4.  Is a recession in the model anything  like a recession  in a modern  economy? 
The remarks in the previous section make it clear that the nodel 
fits the stylized fact of relative price stability when fluctuations are driven 
by preference  shifts, not by technology shifts,  Is it plausible that shifts of 
21 preferences among categories of goods are an important  driving force in a 
modern economy?  In the model  as stated, a shift favoring a competitive 
good  as against a monopoly good causes  a  recession.  More generally, a 
shift away from a sector which  has  excess  capacity toward  one that  is 
operating  at  full  capacity  will  cause  a  recession,  Market  power  is 
important  in  the general case because it is unlikely that a competitive 
sector would  ever operate below capacity. 
In  addition  to  pure  shifts  in  underlying  preferences,  it  is 
appropriate  to  include  changes  in  household  technology  in  the 
interpretation  of the  driving  variable, .  Under  one interpretation, , 
could  be a time  cost of purchasing good  1  in  relation  to good 2.  An 
increase in the inconvenience  or effort  required to make a purchase of good 
2  would be  equivalent to a decline  in  5  and  would  set in motion  the 
decline in total output described by the model. 
In  a  more  general  model,  ö  could  include  other  costs.  In 
particular, if the monopoly good is a durable good frequently purchased on 
credit,  the ö  could include the influence of credit  rationing (Stiglitz and 
Weiss  (1981)).  Or, again for durables,  could capture the benefits to 
delaying durables purchases in times of increased  uncertainty as discussed 
by Bernanke (1983). 
The model  as stated contains no  explanation for  monetary non- 
neutralities.  However,  if  monetary  events  can  generate changes in  11 
through  credit  rationing,  uncertainty,  or  other  mechanisms,  then  the 
model of this paper can explain the propagation of monetary shocks into 
fluctuations in real GNP. 
22 Labor supply assumptions 
A  second  important  question  is  whether  the  labor  supply 
assumptions for sector 2 in the model have any analogy in a real economy. 
There is no contribution to marginal cost from  the value of workers' time. 
Or, to put it a different way, labor supply is perfectly elastic.  The model 
rests  on  elastic labor  supply just  as  the  real  business cycle  and  uage- 
rigidity models  do.  The question is whether this form of the lnstic labor 
supply assumption is more realistic than the other forms. 
The nypothesls of perfectly-elastic labor supply at zero wage has 
hecr wiuely accepted as part of the theory of labor hoarding.  In tirr±es of 
weak demand,  the firm  retains workers  on  tile payroll who are not fully 
occupied.  Their services are available t,  be Itrm fur free.  The firm, not 
the  worker  has  the  perfectly'  elastic  inbor  supply,  hut  the  resulting 
aliocatiju of labo  is as descrined in  the nuodel,  Ciarher  (1986)  has founu 
empirical support 1or the labor-hoarding proposition.  TIe tests and accepts 
the  hypothesis that  prices,  output,  and  eniploynient are  unaffected  by 
changes in wages  paid to workers during periods of labor  hoarding.  In 
other words,  the wage does not allocate labor during downturns, according 
to Garber's evidence.  Firms buy a block of their workers' time and then 
allocate  it  as  they  piease  The  implicit  cost  of labor  up  to the  timm 
commitment is zero, and the assumption of this paper is appropriate. 
A  related  defense  of the  assumption is  that  workers  have  the 
standard textbook labor supply schedule—a vertical line at full-time work, 
23 connected to the origin by a perfectly elastic segment at wage zero.  In 
addition,  the possibility of supplying labor  to a different sector,  which 
would  make the labor supply schedule  for sector  2  be different from the 
labor  supply schedule to the market, is foreclosed.  High mobility costs 
would  be  the  best  explanation  for  the  irrelevance  of  alternative 
employment  opportunities.  Hall  (1987)  shows  that  workers  will  be 
inhibited from moving to other sectors during temporary downturns under 
reasonable assumptions about costs and preferences 
The conclusions  of the model would not be changed if workers put 
a value on their time, as long as the marginal value did not vary with the 
amount  of work.  That is, it is the property of highly elastic supply, not 
the  zero  marginal  value  of  time,  that  is  critical  in  this  and  other 
equilibrium models  of employment fluctuations.  As Rogerson (1988) and 
Hansen  (1985) have noted, highly elastic labor supply can be the result of 
aggregation over individuals who are indifferent between working full days 
and not working at all.  The indifference  could arise from fixed costs of 
going to work.  In Hall (1987),  I  show that it is extremely unlikely that 
workers could  be on the horizontal parts of their labor supply schedules a 
large fraction of the time.  However, fixed costs can contribute a perfectly 
elastic segment to the labor supply schedule, where the flat  part of the 
schedule begins for hours of work somewhat below normal. 
If the perfectly elastic part of the labor supply schedule occurs at a 
positive  wage,  the  model  of  this  paper  can  easily  be  modified  to 
accommodate that feature by absorbing the level of the wage into 1i. 
Figure 5 compares the labor supply assumptions of the four types 
of fluctuations models. The real business  cycle model makes the explicit 
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Amount of work assumption that labor suppiy is highly elastic.  A temporary reduction in 
the real wage brings  a large reduction in work effort  because the worker is 
virtually indifferent to the scheduling of work.  The shadow value of the 
worker's  time  is  set  by the total  amount  of work performed  over the 
lifetime.  Whenever the wage drops below that shadow value,  it is a good 
time  to stop working and  use time for other purposes.  The work  can be 
made up later, when the real wage is back to normal. 
In the wage rigidity model, the worker  agrees to work as much as 
asked by the employer  (up to some limit) at a predetermined wage.  The 
agreement supplants the underlying labor supply schedule of the worker. 
The  allocation of work  proceeds as  if the  labor  supply  schedule were 
perfectly elastic. 
The labor  supply  of this  model  is  a reverse  L.  The  level  of 
employment is frequently along  the flat, perfectly elastic portion because 
the firm frequently has a marginal revenue product of labor equal to zero. 
Obviously, this  would  rarely happen in competition.  The point  of this 
paper is that it can frequently happen with market power. 
The labor supply schedule in a model with fixed costs of going to 
work has a flat segment at a positive wage.  Again,  a firm  with market 
power facing fluctuations in demand may have extensive periods when the 
marginal revenue product of labor schedule intersects the flat segment. 
26 5.  Concluding remarks 
One  of  the  unique  responsibilities of the macroeconomist is  to 
identify the  driving  forces  of economic fluctuations.  The  real  business 
cycle  model  considers  economy-wide  fluctuations  in  productivity  as the 
major  driving force.  Critics have pointed out that technical regress is a 
qnestionahle came  of recessions,  hut  have not been active in  identifying 
alternative driving forces.  In a one-seetor  model, preference  shifts are not 
a plausible driving force, because the only preference shift that could  cause 
a  recession  would  be a  sluft  away from goods consumption and  toward 
leisure consuxnpt ion.  Labeling a recession a period of epidemic laziness is 
unattractive to all schools of niacroeconoinics. 
A  two-sector model  enriches tbe  set  of  possible  driving  forces. 
Productivity  could  shift  in  favor  of  one  sector from  time  to time,  for 
example.  Flowever,  such  shifts  must  be accompanied by  corresponding 
changes in  relative prices.  Because  cyclical  changes in relative prices are 
weak, productivity shifts again seem unattractive  as an important  driving 
force at  business-cycle  frequencies.  On the other hand, shifts in preferences 
from one sector to another are a more promising type of driving force, if 
there is enough asymmetry  between the two  sectors,  Monopoly in  one 
sector and competition in the other provides the necessary  asymmetry.  If 
the  competitive  sector  always operates at  capacity,  but  the  monopoly 
sector  sometimes  operates  below  capacity,  preference shifts  will  cause 
changes in aggregate real GNP but not in the relative price. 
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